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"Until the sale of land is permitted everywhere in Russia—including land sales to 
foreigners—we will never be able to overcome the food crisis. Billions of rubles are 
circulating around the country, but the government does not allow them to be put into 
the land."
These are the words of Vakhtang Makharadze, a businessman from the Moscow region 
and head of the joint enterprise Interferma, spoken during a meeting called by the 
minister of agriculture in the Yel'tsin government. He has built a dairy and meat 
processing plant not on agricultural land, but on land that had been used for a quarry, 
thus getting around the stiff resistance of the nomenklatura bureaucracy.
One year ago, talk like this would have been considered "seditious" even in the Russian 
government White House.
Just as radical was the phrase employed by no less a figure than the minister himself, 
Viktor Khlystun, author of a series of edicts for the new stage of the agrarian reform: "It's 
hopeless to try to carry out a reform without attracting private capital—without [that] it 
will be impossible to put the individual farmer in a strong position for another seven or 
eight years!"
Yel'tsin is promising that the food supply situation will improve in the next six months. So 
far, food prices have gone up 20 or more times—expanding in precisely the same way 
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that the lines have in the stores. In St. Petersburg, elderly people who lived through the 
German blockade during the war have to stand in line for three or four days in order to 
get meat in exchange for their vouchers. Fascistic organizations like Zhirinovsky's 
Liberal Democratic Party are forcing up the pressure in the social boiler. The West's 
humanitarian aid is arriving in homeopathic doses—and ends up being openly resold. 
The fate of Yel'tsin as well as Russia—indeed the fate of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States as a whole—truly depends on the food situation. What are the 
views of the helmsmen? What course have they drawn on their charts?
It is possible to maintain that Gorbachev—whose family background was in farming—
and Yel'tsin—whose biography was that of a typical city party activist—followed parallel 
courses only as far as their attitude toward the kolkhozy is concerned. They used to 
take the view that the kolkhoz-sovkhoz system is a reality and that it has not yet 
exhausted its effectiveness—we need to give the private farmers a chance to compete 
with it, but we mustn't wreck the system. This opinion (and it might have cost Gorbachev 
his party career to adopt a different policy) was shared by Yel'tsin as well right up to the 
end of 1991, when it became evident that the collective farms would never permit the 
individual farmer to become a real force and eventually an economic competitor! Over 
the course of an entire year, the peasant farms—by December 1991 a total of 41,000 
had been registered—managed to come into victorious possession of under one 
percent of agricultural land. Truly a snail's pace—at the same time as the total head of 
cattle in the state agricultural sector fell drastically, the area sown with grain fell and all 
construction came to an abrupt halt.
At the end of 1991 the Russian White House issued several decrees that apparently 
were aimed at reorganizing the entire system of "planned"—i.e., coercive—agriculture, 
and thus creating the social basis for feeding Russian society following the August 1991 
putsch.
The kolkhozy and sovkhozy are to be reorganized; those that are operating at a loss, 
i.e. about 10 percent (a total of over 2,000 in Russia alone), are to be declared bankrupt 
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and sold off. The sale of land within collective farms is permitted. Agricultural workers 
who have received a land allocation are allowed to sell this land outside the collective 
farm—albeit under very stringent conditions. Land can be mortgaged to banks . . .
However, the apparent decisiveness of these measures melts away as soon as one 
raises the bold question of who is going to carrying out this land repartition (cherny 
peredel)—and consequently to whose benefit it is going to be. President Yel'tsin 
provided a clear answer to this question in a government decree that he signed, 
according to which the kolkhoz chairmen or sovkhoz directors are to be appointed to 
head the relevant commissions for land privatization. These figures, who represent the 
top echelon of the agrarian Gulag, are thus not merely recognized as possessing legal 
powers—even after the liquidation of the CPSU Central Committee, the KGB, and other 
pillars of "developed socialism"—but are now made plenipotentiaries for carrying out the 
government's agrarian reform. This authoritarian echelon is to divide up all the arable 
land into state land and private land; it is also to create joint-stock companies, divide up 
collective and state farm property into individual allocations, and so on. The shaky 
prestige of the many thousands of "leadership personnel" in the countryside suddenly is 
enhanced when they are not only given a mission, but also restored to their former 
importance.
When one is familiar with the thought process and former activity of this corpus of 
collective and state farm chairmen—let us not forget that their elected head Vasili 
Starodubtsev is currently in prison as one of the leaders of the putsch and awaiting trial
—one can very confidently predict the course that the future land repartition will take.
What essentially is being proposed is an exchange of power for property, and the top 
echelon of the Agrogulag is effectively being pushed in the direction of self-enrichment. 
In many oblasti of Central Russia, up to 70 percent of the kolkhoz and sovkhoz workers 
are pensioners. These poverty-stricken old people are absolutely incapable of becoming 
individual farmers, indeed they have no idea what independence means and don't want 
it. What will happen is that they will quickly and gladly sell their portions of land and 
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property for next to nothing to so-called "kind protectors." Over an area of 220 million 
hectares of Russian agricultural land with 20 million cows and 70 billion rubles worth of 
basic production facilities, a "land-grab" (prikhvatizatsiya) will occur, from which all 
outsiders and city residents—in general, anyone not belonging to the Agrogulag—will be 
excluded with great care.
Why did the Russian White House adopt such a policy? One can only hypothesize . . . 
In the first place, the old party nomenklatura's influence is very strong in Yel'tsin's 
entourage. If it's enough for former obkom secretaries to have a huge office and 
participate in the big shareout, kolkhoz chairmen need to be given the leading role in the 
agrarian reform if their loyalty to the regime is to be assured. The Yel'tsin political bloc 
has no one to rely upon away in the countryside in view of the fact that a free peasantry 
is only just being born as a social stratum, and so far there are scarcely a hundred 
thousand persons working as private farmers. No doubt the view is that the collective 
farm bosses may grab too much in some places, but on the other hand they'll keep the 
temperature down in the countryside, keep the village people out of a civil war . . . 
Evidently this must be the whole motivation.
Since the beginning of perestroika, the problem of agriculture was never given primary 
importance—and it seems as though it's still on the back burner. Yet it is impossible to 
go on living on food from abroad—we have no way of paying for other peoples' bread! 
Two thousand tons of gold from the Russian national gold reserve have been wasted 
and disappeared, service of the foreign debt alone requires $20 billion a year, oil dollar 
revenue has dropped to just a few million dollars a day. Where is Russia to get the 
investment capital for highways, housing, agricultural machinery, pedigree cattle—the 
billions of rubles needed to provide equipment for individual farms? At today's prices 
under the Burbulis-Gaidar government team it takes a minimum of five million rubles to 
set up an average peasant farm!
As far as expectations for help from the West are concerned, we have to remember that 
there was never a gulf between two poles in agriculture, on the one hand Soviet 
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collective farms, and on the other American free farming, never a situation of 
independence one from the other. It was American agribusiness that helped Stalin carry 
out the mechanization of the collective farms, since the tractor and combine harvester 
plants were purchased in the West, while for more than a quarter of a century food was 
imported, as a result of which millions of acres in North America were sown with grain in 
order to satisfy the needs of Moscow, Leningrad, and the crews of Soviet nuclear 
submarines. Without regular American grain sales to the USSR a food crisis would have 
arisen many years earlier—and would have been resolved one way or another—quite 
possibly, tragically.
Now, however, such a strapping businessman as the boss of Interferma is talking about 
the sale of land for hard currency as a means of preventing the country from going 
under and of saving the Russian people. What the agriculture minister now dares to say 
thus far only relates to domestic business in rubles, even though this already represents 
a departure from the economic orthodoxy of state credit, the state plan and state 
deliveries.
"Not one foot of land for foreigners!" is a typical piece of demagoguery from the party 
nomenklatura. Do not the billions of tons of oil, the thousands of tons of gold, and the 
ocean of lumber sold to the West for the sake of the preservation of the regime 
represent the devastation of the land and natural resources? How can this be compared 
to an authorization given to foreign farmers and new landowners to grow grain and 
enrich the soil, and thus enrich the Russian diet and the post-Soviet supply of 
foodstuffs?
I am no supporter of selling what does not belong to me personally. And out of the 
whole of the land of Russia all that does belong to me are the usual six-hundredths of a 
hectare officially allotted to people in accordance with the law passed under Gorbachev. 
But if it is a question of feeding millions of hungry people, if nowadays children eat no 
better than they did during the war, if the only national riches that it is still possible to sell 
without waste for the benefit of the people are precisely land for grazing and the plow—
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as an ordinary Muscovite I am inclined to approve buying and selling the ware that can 
truly bring freedom and plenty—land.
While I was visiting universities in Virginia last fall a certain agribusinessman—we'll call 
him John Smith—proposed to me a downright bizarre deal:
"Help me buy as much land somewhere in the Moscow area as I'll need to keep 60,000 
pedigree Holsteins. I guarantee you that you'll have no more problems with shortages of 
milk and cheese in Moscow. I'm ready to put money into this."
Until a month ago I thought this John Smith was just a wild dreamer who knew nothing 
about conditions in Russia. But it may yet turn out that he is farsighted, while I'm just 
stuck in the mud.
Copyright Boston University Trustees 1992
Unless otherwise indicated, all articles appearing in this journal have been commissioned especially for 
Perspective. This article was originally published at http://www.bu.edu/iscip/vol2/Chernichenko.html. 
6
